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During the 1920s, British-American oil and railway 
developers in the former province of Mosul created 
burgeoning ethnic divides. Many of the people in the 
Mosul region disagreed with the province coming 
under the direct rule of Baghdad as they were 
discontented with centralization. Yet, they lacked a 
sense of a nationalist identity. The British 
considered mineral exploitation more imperative 
than these anti-centralization sentiments. As a 
consequence, the British imperial power 
disregarded the ethnic diversity of Mosul and their 
objections to becoming part of a united Iraq. This is 
evident when examining actions of European 
consortium Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC). 
Before the finalization of Mosul’s inclusion in Iraq, 
APOC surveyed a pipeline and railway from Kirkuk 
to Haifa in 1922. Mosul’s inclusion in Iraq, where the 
town of Kirkuk lies, occurred in 1926.  
  
Figure 1: Map of Iraq.1 
 
Mineral resources in Iraq also engendered a dispute between British and American oil 
ambitions. British oil hegemony assuaged the quarrel over oil resources, because U.S. 
interests determined that aligning with the British imperial power would amount to them 
obtaining mineral rights. Furthermore, British authority and U.S. ambitions for Iraqi oil 
coincided with railway expansion, and they were attentive toward the potential Kirkuk-Haifa oil 
and railway lines. Obtaining mineral and railway concessions was a priority for the U.S. State 
Department. Nevertheless, the British sought to maintain their predominance over Iraqi oil. In 
1925, U.S. Standard Oil Company bought part ownership of the Turkish Petroleum Company 
(TPC). TPC was the main purveyor of oil after the 1925 Kirkuk-Haifa oil and railway 
concession, an agreement officially signed between the Iraqi government and TPC in 1928. 
British and American consortiums such as APOC and TPC were a factor in the Mosul 
question. Consortium hegemony over mineral resources and railway infrastructure were the 
dominant themes throughout U.S. correspondence during the 1920s. 
 
 
Historiography of Iraq: Oil and Railways 
 
Historical scholars of 1920s Iraq argue that the premise for the founding of the Iraqi state was 
based on oil: therein lies the dichotomies of the historical scholarship. One argument leans 
toward how oil influenced ethnic divides, while the other argument does not consider the oil 
question and insinuates that when Iraq formed, the British took ethnic heterogeneity into 
account. Another explanation suggests that oil was paramount to the British agenda in Iraq, 
                                                 
1 Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), xix. 
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while the British all together disregarded the issue of ethnic heterogeneity when creating the 
Iraqi state. However, the scholarship lacks a concrete analysis on the connection between oil 
and railways and how these issues brought to fruition conflict amongst the heterogeneous 
population of Mosul. Iraqi oil and railways were capitulations granted by the Iraqi government 
under the discretion of the British Iraqi Administration to British-American oil consortiums, while 
the British government ignored the impact these capitulations were to have on the 
heterogeneous population. Before Iraq’s creation, the area was made up of semi-autonomous 
provinces where ethnic lines were blurred.2 The population in Mosul aligned themselves with 
more than one ethnicity, and therefore, uniting Mosul, Basra and Baghdad into a single entity 
led to an “emerging fault-line” amongst the heterogeneous population.3 Proposed oil and 
railway lines that cut through the Mosul region was at the expense of Mosul’s autonomy. Mosul 
came under Iraq’s wing because of an insistence for exploiting its potential mineral resources.  
  
Peter Sluglett’s and William Stivers’ scholarship represent earlier historical analyses of Iraq 
and oil, while demonstrating the importance of oil to the British. However, their scholarship 
does not establish the connection between ethnic heterogeneity and the Mosul question. Peter 
Sluglett’s Britain in Iraq: Contriving King and Country (2nd ed., 2007), whose first edition was 
written in the 1970’s, and William Stivers’ Supremacy and Oil: Iraq, Turkey, and the Anglo-
American Order, 1918-1930 (1982) address the relationship between the British and the oil 
companies who wanted concessionary power in Iraq. According to these scholars, Mosul’s 
inclusion into the Iraqi state was a result of oil ambitions. Sluglett uses primary source 
documentation from the British Foreign Office, Air Ministry, and Colonial office records, 
including private and publicized documents. Continuing the tradition of using public and private 
governmental documents, Stivers’ scholarship uses the Foreign Office Political Files, but he 
also includes primary sources pertaining to U.S. foreign relations, several U.S. edited 
document collections, and personal accounts.  
 
The difference between Sluglett’s and Stivers’ arguments lie in their elucidation of British and 
American oil ambitions. For instance, Sluglett argues that the British authorities set up the Iraqi 
government in a way that was to best serve British interests, with concerns for “its 
communications with India, the Empire air route, and the protection of the Persian and Iraqi 
oilfields.”4 Like Sluglett, Stivers explains British involvement in Iraq as a strategic move in 
maintaining control over India as well as Iraqi oil. 5  However, Stivers argues that British control 
over Iraq served American interests because stability in the region meant tranquil conditions 
for U.S. investment and trade.6 Charles Tripp’s History of Iraq (2000) and Toby Dodge’s 
Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied provides a broader context 
for the formation of the Iraqi state. Tripp argues that the British owned a substantial stake of 
TPC, and therefore, these British authorities saw Mosul as an opportunity for revenue and the 
possibility of removing Iraqi part-ownership of oil concessions.7 Tripp, Stivers, and Sluglett 
mainly use British government documents in their historical work, while other scholarship uses 
                                                 
2 Arbella Bet-Shlimon, “Group Identities, Oil, and the Political Domain of Kirkuk: A Historical Perspective,” in Journal of 
Urban History, vol. 38: 2012, 916, accessed: February 10, 2014. DOI: 10.1177/0096144212449143 
3 Ibid, 915. 
4 Peter Sluglett, Britain in Iraq: Contriving King and Country (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 6/7. 
5 William Stivers, Supremacy and Oil: Iraq, Turkey, and the Anglo-American World Order, 1918-1930 (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1982), 18. 
6 Ibid, 192. 
7 Tripp, A History of Iraq, 60. 
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a diverse subset of primary sources ranging from newspaper articles to poetry in addition to 
government correspondence. 
 
While Stivers’ and Sluglett’s main goal throughout their scholarship is to show British and U.S. 
imperial concerns for oil, another theme throughout the literature establishes how imperial 
mineral ambitions affected the ethnic heterogeneous population of Iraq. Arbella Bet-Shlimon in 
her work “Group Identities, Oil, and the Local Political Domain in Kirkuk: A Historical 
Perspective” (2012) argues that to consider Kirkuk’s oil as merely a commodity denies the 
historical realities that oil produced for the population such as oil urbanization, which “created 
ethnic identities and rivalries.”8 Meanwhile, Guiditta Fontana’s “Creating Nations, Establishing 
States: Ethno-Religious Heterogeneity and the British Creation of Iraq in 1919-23” (2010) 
argues that “establishment of nation-states was complicated by the existence of a variety of 
minorities and rival ethno-religious groups,” and that “British policymakers took these factors 
into account in 1919-20.”9 Though Guiditta’s work does not consider oil, her view is starkly 
contrasted to Bet-Shlimon’s scholarship when concerning the effect of the British on Iraq. 
Guiditta states that there were pre-existing ethnic rivalries throughout Iraq, while Bet-Shlimon 
implicates that oil ambitions created the ethnic conflict within Kirkuk. Both scholars use 
Colonial office records, and other governmental documents; however, Bet-Shlimon uses poetry 
to accentuate the tumultuousness of oil urbanism during the 1950’s for Kirkukis.  
 
One of the main themes throughout the scholarship on Iraq focuses on ethnic identities and 
rivalries, and how oil and the British were factors in creating new issues after the formation of 
Iraq. Another dichotomy within the literature concerns itself solely with the British and U.S. oil 
interests in Iraq. The gap appears to lie within uniting both U.S. and British oil interests relative 
to the central issue to the Mosul question of ethnic divides, while also correlating oil and 
railways as a unifying factor of interest for the imperial ambitions. The literature on railways is 
inherently scarce, as the most recent scholarship on 1920s Iraqi railways is Edward Mead 
Earle’s Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway: A Study in Imperialism (1923), 
and other historical scholarship tends to focus on the Baghdad railway prior to the creation of 
Iraq such as Sean McMeekin’s The Berlin-Baghdad Express: the Ottoman Empire and 
Germany’s Bid for World Power (2010). Throughout this work, it will be argued that the British-
American concern for oil and railways created burgeoning ethnic rivalries in the Mosul region 
during the interwar period, and that these imperial powers were backing Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company and Turkish Petroleum Company without concern for the ramifications of having 
Mosul governed by a Sunni Arab elite in Baghdad.  
 
 
Iraqi Railways and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company: General Imperial Interests and its 
Relationship with the Iraqi Government 
 
During the 1920s, British imperial interests encompassed Iraqi railway infrastructure and oil 
resources. While the British were in charge of the Iraqi mandate, the U.S. placed consulates in 
Baghdad to build a cordial relationship with the Iraqi government. The U.S. consulates of 
                                                 
8 Bet-Shlimon, “Group Identities, Oil, and the Political Domain of Kirkuk: A Historical Perspective,” 915. 
9 Guiditta Fontana, “Creating Nations, Establishing States: Ethno-Religious Heterogeneity and the British Creation of Iraq in 




Baghdad sent correspondence to the Department of State commenting on British affairs, with 
an opportunistic eye for U.S. investment for Iraqi oil and railways. Prior to the Iraqi mandate, 
American commercial enterprises had limited contact with Ottoman provinces: dates and 
licorice root were their main imports, while the main export was oil into Iraq by Standard Oil 
Company of New York. 10 By the 1920s, the Iraqi oil question concerned the U.S. Standard Oil 
Company (Socony) and the U.S. State Department. A mutual attraction to oil linked the U.S. 
State Department and Standard Oil together for “profit-seeking ambitions.”11  
 
However, British imperial ambitions comprised of more than Iraqi oil and railway infrastructure, 
because different philosophies for Middle Eastern policy were dependent on the division of 
authority. The Colonial Office, Foreign Office, War Office and India office, were each given a 
piece of power, which “ensured that visions for the territorial and political organization of the 
occupied areas became a source of bureaucratic infighting.”12 On the other hand, the premise 
for British post-war policy on Middle Eastern petroleum was a desire for mineral resource 
hegemony.13  Once the British received the Iraqi mandate, a major shift in the political realities 
of the inhabitants accumulated into hostility that led to the June 1920 revolt.14 Because of the 
insurgents’ destruction of the railway lines, it was necessary to reconstruct the line and shut 
down the route between Basra and Baghdad. The stability of the railway system throughout 
Iraq required a grant to replace unsafe timber bridges with permanent lines. 15 This resulted in 
an economic deficit for British authority between 1921 and 1922, due to railway infrastructural 
development and the high cost of oil per ton. According to the Foreign Office report by the High 
Commissioner on the Finances, Administration and Condition of Iraq, the requirement 
necessary for capital investment was to ensure that the railways up to a “moderate standard of 
equipment and to provide access to Karbala and Najaf.” Otherwise, the railways were not up to 
a standard of use for achieving their commercial potentialities. 16 
 
As a public utility, the Iraqi railways were unprofitable; therefore, the British considered 
potential buyers. Correspondence between the American Consulate of Baghdad and the U.S. 
Department of State pondered on whether the Iraqi government was to run the Mesopotamian 
railways. The Iraqi railway question was due to the British Disposal and Liquidation 
Commission contemplating the transfer of the Iraqi railways to the Iraqi government, in 1922. 
Furthermore, the commission also reviewed the possibility of permitting the Iraqi government 
to sell or lease railway properties to private companies.17 However, the British determined it 
may prove more beneficial to concede railway and oil to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
(APOC) than to sell the railways to the Iraqi government. That year, APOC took over the Hillah 
to Basra rail line, to use the line’s materials for constructing a railway from Tikrit to Mosul by 
                                                 
10 Stivers, Supremacy and Oil, 108. 
11 Ibid, 113. 
12 Fontana, “Creating Nations, Establishing States: Ethno-Religious Heterogeneity and the British Creation of Iraq in 1919–
23,” 2.  
13 Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, 68/69. 
14 Tripp, A History of Iraq, 43. 
15 Foreign Office, “Report by His Majesty’s High Commissioner on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the ‘Iraq for 
the period from 1st October 1920 and 31st March 1922 [FO 371/8998],” in Iraq Administration Reports, 1914-1932, vol. 7, 
1920-1924, ed. Robert L. Jarman (Melksham and Oxford: Redwood Press Ltd. and Green Street Bindery, 1992), 64/65. 
16 Ibid, 65. 
17 NAUS, RG59, M1370, reel 26, 890g.77, “Telegram received,” Harvey to the Secretary of State, Washington, February 11, 
1922./ NAUS, RG59, M1370, reel 26, 890g.77/oug, “Telegram Sent,” Fletcher from the Department of State of Washington 
to the American Consulate of Baghdad, February 14, 1922; 1. 
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way of Kirkuk and Erbil.18 Heading the prospect was Sir AT Wilson, former British civil 
commissioner of Baghdad from 1918-1920 and Resident Manager of APOC, who in 1922 was 
“looking over the survey of the proposed railway and pipeline to the Mediterranean.”19 
Nevertheless, the Iraqi government still hoped to purchase the railways.  
 
In February 1923, an interview with the Minister of Public Works Yasin Pasha Al-Hashimi and 
the American Consulate of Baghdad revealed that “the British were asking 3 ½ millions sterling 
for the railways which consist of 580 miles, but [al-Hashimi] thought this amount exorbitant, 
and opposed buying at these figures.”20 The Iraqi government could only afford to replace the 
existing railways but could not afford to purchase the 580 miles of railway at war prices. 
Though the British government in May 1923 transferred provisionally the management of the 
railways to the Iraqi government’s Minister of Communications and Works, the British relied on 
other sources for concessionary power, such as APOC, over the Mesopotamian railways. 21 
Any power the Iraqi government had over the Mesopotamian railways was inherently limited. 
 
The Iraqi government’s Minister of Public Works al-Hashimi was, however, in an unpopular 
position with the British. Interestingly, al-Hashimi took advantage of his position to obtain both 
land and use laws to validate such transactions as well as to enable tax exemption for his 
behest.22 U.S. capital investment in railways and oil were an interest of al-Hashimi, which the 
American consulate of Baghdad stated: “I told him that if American capital participated in the 
exploitation of oil, I saw no reason why it should not be available for other necessary 
developments, as soon as the status of the country was definitely determined and there is 
reasonable hope of security.”23 al-Hashimi thought that TPC’s claims to oil was weak and 
disfavored its ratification, while indicating that the Iraqi government was “opposed to giving any 
concession to the Anglo Persian Oil Company if another can be found […].”24  
 
The crux of al-Hashimi’s argument established a distaste for the control over the railway 
system and its correlative, oil, for both APOC and TPC. In 1922, the American consulate 
suspected that APOC was to receive control over the Mesopotamian railways, as it was certain 
that “the so-called Government of Iraq will not operate them.”25 This perception came from the 
apparent connection of APOC to the 1914 D’Arcy concession that gave APOC the ability to 
build oil wells throughout the Ottoman Empire’s territories.26 APOC obtained its own route in 
                                                 
18 NAUS RG59, M1370, reel 26, 890g.77/3, “Future of Iraq Railways,” American Consulate of Baghdad Thomas R. Owens to 
the Secretary of State, Washington, March 2, 1922; 1. 
19 Ibid. 
20 NAUS, RG59, M1370, reel 26, 890g.77/7, “Interview with Yasin Pasha El-Hashimi, Minister of Public Works,” American 
Consulate of Baghdad to the Secretary of State, Washington, January 19, 1923; 1. 
21 Colonial Office [Colonial No. 13], “Report by His Britannic Majesty’s Government on the Administration of ‘Iraq For the 
Period April, 1923--December, 1924,” in Iraq Administration Reports, 1914-1932, vol. 7, 1920-1924, ed. Robert L. Jarman 
(Melksham and Oxford: Redwood Press Ltd. and Green Street Bindery, 1992), 685. 
22 Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, 64. 
23 NAUS, RG59, M1370, reel 26, 890g.77/7, “Interview with Yasin Pasha El-Hashimi, Minister of Public Works,” American 
Consulate of Baghdad to the Secretary of State, Washington, January 19, 1923; 2. 
24 Ibid. 
25 NAUS, RG59, M1370, reel 26, 890g.77/2, “Transfer of the Mesopotamian Railways,” Thomas R. Owens American 
Consulate of Baghdad to the Secretary of State Washington, February 16, 1922; 1. 
26 Colonial Office [Colonial No. 4], “Iraq. Report on Iraq Administration, April 1922—March 1923 [FO 371/8998],” in Iraq 
Administration Reports, 1914-1932, vol. 7, 1920-1924, ed. Robert L. Jarman (Melksham and Oxford: Redwood Press Ltd. 
and Green Street Bindery, 1992), 359. 
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Iraq in 1922, a line constructed from Ali Gharbi and maintained as a private tramline for the 
company’s use only.27   
 
In 1923, the British government granted APOC control of an Iraqi railway line in Khanakin City, 
which gave APOC exclusivity for that particular line of 27½ miles in length.28 According to 
Sluglett in Britain in Iraq, the Iraqi government concluded that more liberal control over the Iraqi 
railways may lead to a more amicable relationship with Britain. The Iraqi governments “only 
hope for amelioration lay in tinkering with the details of the Anglo-Iraqi relationship, and 
trusting that Britain might eventually be persuaded.”29 By August 31, 1929, the Iraqi 
government’s desire to purchase the Iraq railways, along with the port of Basra, from the 
British had not occurred because the Iraqi government considered the asking price more than 
what the properties were worth.30 Further speculation in November 6, 1929 on the issue of 
Iraqi railways proved unfruitful since “the King’s speech at the opening of Parliament did not 
touch on the [Iraqi] Government’s program regarding the taking over of the Iraq Railways. 
Rumored that a mission was to be sent to London to negotiate but as yet no date of departure 
has been set.”31 Nevertheless, the British wanted to maintain and extend railways while 
furthering its oil prospects. A purported railway project envisaged by the British was to parallel 
the route of the Mosul pipeline under both British and French discretion, and indirect U.S. 
control.32 
 
The Kirkuk-Haifa Line to the Mediterranean: The Implications of Oil and the Mosul 
Question 
 
The Mosul pipeline and railway concession was a settled matter by 1928 between the Iraqi 
government and TPC consortium. However, the question of dominion over the Mosul region 
was a separate dispute, entwined with the concern for oil. The British placed elites into 
positions of authority within the Iraqi government that aligned themselves with British 
policymaking. Some historians have suggested that the British- Iraqi government relationship 
constituted a hybrid culture that enabled “the constant fusion and mutual synthesis between 
the cultures of the colonizer and the colonized and their representation as “self” and “other” 
become impossible to maintain.”33 While the hybrid relationship between “colonizer” and 
“colonized” may apply to the Sunni elite and the British, and was a strategy the British tended 
to use in other parts of Iraq, the theory does not reflect how much of the population within Iraq 
lacked an amicable relationship with Britain and a voice in the main governmental body of 
Baghdad.   
 
                                                 
27 NAUS RG59, M1370, reel 26, 890g.77/13, “Future of Iraq Railways,” Thomas R. Owens American Consulate of Baghdad to 
the Secretary of State, Washington, Copy letter form High Commissioner of Baghdad, March 2, 1922; 4. 
28 NAUS, RG59, M1370, reel 26, 890g.77/13, “Latest Information About Iraq Railways: Political, Commercial, and 
Construction Plans,” John Randolph American Consulate of Baghdad, December 26, 1923; 5. 
29 Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, 64. 
30 NAUS, RG59, M1370, reel 26, 890g.77/30, “Document File Note, See: 790g.91/10, For: #951,” From Baghdad, Name: 
Randolph, August 31, 1929; 1. 
31 NAUS, RG59, M1370, reel 26, 890g.77/31, “Document File Note, See: 890g.032/8, For: #1008,” From Baghdad, Name: 
Brown, November 6, 1929; 1. 
32 NAUS, RG59, M1370, reel 26, 890g.77/32, “Document File Note, See: 890g.6363 T 84/393, For: #262,” From Beirut, 
Name Brandt, December 3, 1929; 1. 
33 Bashkin, The Other Iraq, 3. 
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Baghdad was the central authority of the Iraqi government, led by a Sunni Arab elite; yet, 
Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul consisted of a diverse population. On a religious level, according 
to Guiditta Fontana, there were a significant number of Christian and Jewish minorities present 
in an urban setting.34 Where as many of the Shi’a Arabs lived in the former vilayets Baghdad 
and Basra, along with a considerable number of Sunnis in Baghdad.35 While Shi’as constituted 
the majority of the Iraqi population like the other ethnicities, at the time they were not a single 
community.36 In Northern Iraq, there were ethnic groups such as Turkmen, Kurds, Arabs, with 
a smaller population of Chaldo-Assyrian Christians, and a larger Sunni population.37 However, 
Turkmen, Kurds, and Arabs were a blurred ethnic concept to those who presided in the area 
particularly because “an individual’s or family’s self-identity often stemmed from a combination 
of their preferred language and social status rather than their ancestry.”38  Therefore, the 
concept of nationalism was not prevalent during the 1920s amongst the ethno-heterogeneous 
population of Iraq. On the other hand, the British and the U.S. consulate were averse to 
nationalist sentiments, as they were concerned with maintaining control and stability over the 
region for resource exploitation. After all, “America’s silent partnership with British power” 
hinged itself on the mandate system’s “responsibility for bringing order to the underdeveloped 
territories taken over from the defeated states.”39 
 
While factors such as the complex ethno-religious heterogeneity of the former Ottoman 
provinces of Basra, Mosul, and Baghdad, perhaps were considerations of the British 
policymakers in 1919-20, the British opted for “strategic rather than ethnic arguments” for 
defining the frontiers of Iraq.40 This was specifically evident in how the British conducted its 
agreements, or rather lack thereof, with the Kurds. A group of elite Kurds advocated for 
autonomy, sending a representative to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and leading to 
further discussions at the Conference of London and the San Remo Conference of 1920, this 
discussion was not a prevalent theme amongst the general Kurdish population. The San Remo 
Conference amounted to Article 62 in the Treaty of Sèvres, signed in August 1920 that called 
for “local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas.”41 Additionally, Article 64 detailed that 
such regions included those neighboring Mosul. However, the British found that promises 
based on creating ethno-homogenous states were inconvenient; after all, money and 
manpower to enforce such a policy was not lucrative, and to add to matters, the Higher 
Commissioner Sir Percy Cox advocated for the Kurdish fusion into the Iraqi state.42 
The relationship between the policy of incorporation and the issue of Iraqi oil and railways may 
seem unclear. Before the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, the British and French petroleum 
ministers, Long and Bérenger, established a provisional covenant which amounted to “making 
over Deutsche Bank’s former 25% share in the TPC (confiscated during the war by the 
Custodian of Enemy Property) to French interests” in exchange for a former agreement of the 
                                                 
34 Fontana, “Creating Nations, Establishing States: Ethno-Religious Heterogeneity and the British Creation of Iraq in 1919-
23,” 2. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Tripp, A History of Iraq, 3. 
37 Bet-Shlimon, “Group Identities, Oil and the Local Political Domain in Kirkuk: A Historical Perspective,” 914. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Stivers, Supremacy and Oil, 119. 
40 Fontana, “Creating Nations, Establishing States: Ethno-Religious Heterogeneity and the British Creation of Iraq in 1919-
23,” 2/3. 




French to hand over Mosul to Britain back in 1918. 43  Formalization of these arguments came 
to their crux during the San Remo Oil Agreement of 1920. After obtaining stock in TPC, the 
French was to have partial influence over the Kirkuk-Haifa line of 1928.  
 
In the town of Kirkuk, there were those who identified as Kurdish that, along with other 
Kirkukis, who opposed Mosul’s inclusion in Iraq.44 However, Kurdish nationalism was not a 
dominant sentiment during the 1920s.45 The issue of the “Mosul Question” came to the 
forefront during Iraqi centralization from 1918 to 1926. As “the seat of an Ottoman 
administrative subdivision within the province of Mosul,” including Basra, it fell under 
Baghdad’s authority during the Mandate period.46 Even after the British received the former 
Ottoman vilayet of Mosul from the French, where a large Kurdish population resided, Mosul 
was still a disputed territory because of Turkish claims to Mosul. However, as a result of “the 
exigencies of creating the Iraqi state outweigh[ing] special claims of Kurds,” Britain took an 
additional step by to inviting them to endorse or “vote” in favor of a constitutional monarchy of 
King Faisal.47  In July 1921, Faisal’s election was at a “suspiciously high 96 percent” approval 
rate from Iraqis.48 To further support this propaganda, according to one source, the Kurdish 
regions in Mosul and Erbil Divisions “twice declared their intention of uniting with the Iraq, once 
in June, 1921, before the arrival of the Amir Faisal, and again in August, […] they swore 
allegiance to him as King.” 49 However, the Kirkuk Division asked for the postponing of the 
decision and had not sworn allegiance to the King.50 
 
A political fault line emerged in Kirkuk between those “who wished to cooperate with Anglo-
Iraqi centralization and those who opposed it,” while some elite families and tribes pandered to 
both political sides of the Mosul question.51 For instance, one elite patriarch ‘Abd al-Majid Beg 
obtained a relationship with the British authorities within Kirkuk and obtained a position as 
governor.52 Despite these symbiotic relationships on a local level between the British and the 
elites of Kirkuk, the British imperial agenda focused on the capital side of the Mosul question 
specifically with regards to oil concessions and railway expansion. American consulate of 
Baghdad John Randolph to the Secretary of State in Washington DC on July 10, 1924 
reported that construction begun on the railway extension from Kingerban to Kirkuk. Consulate 
Randolph explained that the Kingerban-Kirkuk line was to be finished by November of that 
year, and noted that there was not an existing petroleum concession. Allegedly, the British 
negotiated the Kirkuk concession with the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC). 53 Meanwhile, 
the U.S. sought to influence the British positively by aligning with the imperial power, in hopes 
of gaining oil rights in Iraq. It was Standard Oil’s partnership with TPC in 1925 that instituted 
U.S. involvement in matters of oil in Iraq. 
 
                                                 
43 Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, 70. 
44 Bet-Shlimon, “Group Identities, Oil, and the Local Political Domain in Kirkuk: A Historical Perspective,” 917. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid, 916. 
47 Holden, A Documentary History of Modern Iraq, 74. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Colonial Office, “Iraq. Report on Iraq Administration, April 1922—March 1923 [FO 371/8998],” 32. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Bet-Shlimon, “Group Identities, Oil, and the Local Political Domain in Kirkuk: A Historical Perspective,” 916/917. 
52 Ibid, 917. 
53 NAUS, RG59, M1370, reel 26, 890g.77/17, “Negotiations for Irrigation, Agricultural and Petroleum Concessions In Iraq 
(Mesopotamia),” American Consulate of Baghdad John Randolph to the Secretary of State, Washington, July 10, 1924; 1/2. 
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Since 1922, the Kirkuk-Haifa rail line was in a state of negotiation. It seemed like the line was 
going to be built by APOC under the discretion of AT Wilson. As Resident Manager of APOC, 
Wilson’s association to the Haifa-Baghdad line, which was to connect to Kirkuk and Erbil, was 
as a contributor to the surveying force for the potential railway and pipeline.54 According to 
Wilson, Iraq needed improved communications “which are essential if its agricultural and 
mineral resources are to be developed.”55 TPC received the Kirkuk line concession instead of 
APOC in a 1925 agreement.  
 
TPC was a consortium of oil companies originating prior to the First World War that had an 
existing agreement with the Ottoman Empire for Mesopotamian oil prospecting. However, as a 
result of the British being on the winning side at the end of the war, the German and Ottomans 
surrendered their shares of TPC to “Allied interests.”56 By the late 1920s, the forfeited areas 
formerly owned by Germany and the Ottoman Empire were “owned jointly by the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company (23.75 per cent), Royal Dutch Shell (23.75 per cent), Compagnie 
Français des Pétrole (23.75 per cent), a US-based consortium, later shared equally between 
Standard Oil of New Jersey and Mobil, and Gulbenkian (5 per cent).”57 TPC negotiated an oil 
concession agreement with the Iraqi government by March 1925. The TPC concession 
agreement also marked a turning point in American involvement in Iraq. In 1925, Standard Oil 
was able to participate in any projects TPC obtained. By 1928, the concession agreement 
between TPC and the Iraqi government allowed Standard Oil to benefit from its relationship 
with TPC.58 This meant a pipeline was to be built near the Kirkuk neighborhood, which led to 
an oil urbanized city.59  
 
Evidently, the American Consulate to the Secretary of State explained that TPC was creating a 
pipeline from the oilfields in the Kirkuk area. 60 The pipeline, estimating to be 700 miles long, 
was intended to reach the Mediterranean Sea at a Syrian port, and led “through a country 
where there are many wells which would mean probably an important saving on water 
transportation for the different pumping stations.”61 One consideration for the pipeline was for 
TPC engineers and geologists to create the line from the Kirkuk oilfields via the Hit-Rutba-
Hauran-Haifa route near the Hejaz Railway for an estimated 800 miles long.62 According to 
Sluglett, by 1930 the compromise on the pipeline was to be above Rutba, with one part to 
Haifa and another to Tripoli, which was formally agreed upon with TPC as the Iraq Petroleum 
Company in March 1931.63  
 
The relationship between Kirkuk and TPC was evident in terms of the 1925 agreement 
between the Iraqi government and TPC. TPC and the Iraqi government’s agreement allowed 
                                                 
54 NAUS RG59, M1370, reel 26, 890g.77/3, “Future of Iraq Railways,” American Consulate of Baghdad Thomas R. Owens to 
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55 NAUS RG59, M1370, reel 26, 890g.77/3, “Clipping from “the Bagdad Times” dated February 17, 1922,” in “Future of Iraq 
Railways,” American Consulate of Baghdad Thomas R. Owens to the Secretary of State, Washington, March 2, 1922; 3. 
56 Tripp, A History of Iraq, 60. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Stivers, Supremacy and Oil, 130. 
59 Bet-Shlimon, “Group Identities, Oil, and the Political Domain of Kirkuk: A Historical Perspective,” 915. 
60 NAUS, RG59, reel 26, 890g.77/21, “Pipeline to Mediterranean: Route to be Studied: Haifa Route Preferred for Pipeline and  
Railroad,” John Randolph American Consulate of Baghdad to the Secretary of State, Washington, January 17, 1928; 1. 
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62 Ibid. 
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the company control of particular areas of Iraq. For instance, the terms of the previous 
concession agreement was for TPC to continue as a British-registered company and granted 
exclusive rights of exploration in all of Iraq, not including the former vilayet of Basra.64 It was 
under this agreement that put into motion the ratification of the tripartite Anglo-Turkish-Iraqi 
Treaty by Iraqi parliament, which settled the Mosul question in July 1926.65  TPC had a fixed 
period to select a number of land plots and to commit itself to begin drilling for oil within a few 
years.  For each metric ton of oil that TPC produced, they were to pay an agreed sum to the 
Iraqi government. Meanwhile, the British relationship with TPC concerned itself with not only 
the pipeline but also a railway to connect the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf in order 
for the British Empire to have a developed line of communication as well as a way of guarding 
the mineral resources and railroad infrastructure “to be fought for in case of future wars.”66 This 
venture was in the works by the British since APOC planned to create a pipeline to the 
Mediterranean as early as 1922, suggesting that an undertaking and attentiveness toward the 





By 1931, IPC recognized Kirkuk as a beneficial center of industry and labor, which many 
Kirkukis relied upon for their livelihood.67 However, the concern for oil in Kirkuk preceded the 
TPC concession of 1928. A decision to build a 
line from Kirkuk to the Mediterranean was in 
deliberation since 1922. U.S. involvement in the 
negotiations of the Kirkuk-Haifa line was a 
result of Standard Oil’s (Socony) part 
ownership of TPC.  
 
Figure 2: Oil wells and camp of the Iraq 
Petroleum Company.68 
 
Despite Iraq gaining its independence from the 
British by 1932, the conditions of British 
authority remained. Many of the British officials 
and advisers were present in Iraq and IPC’s control over oil in Kirkuk was unabated. 69 The 
U.S. preferred Iraq under longer guidance by the British. This was because the U.S. wanted to 
maintain their capitulations, while the British government instituted an initially de jure Iraqi 
independence to lessen any imposing financial burdens that it had on Britain.70 Meanwhile, the 
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65 Ibid. 
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eastern Mediterranean,” Photograph (1932), Library of Congress, URL: http://www.loc.gov/pictures/resource/matpc.16256/, 
accessed: February 1, 2014. 
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U.S. wanted Iraq to remain stable in order to protect its capital projects and its “open door” 
policy. After all, the U.S. Wilsonian principle of “self-determination” was in fact married to the 
idea of free and open markets. Therefore, preventing nationalistic sentiments amongst Iraqis 
was imperative to U.S. oil ambitions, as in their mind, this would have brought instability within 
the region. As long as the British authority preserved such stability, the U.S. enjoyed an open 
market and avoided the expense of maintaining dominion.71   
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